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Original scientific paper 
The present study aims to investigate some mechanisms of corporate governance on profit smoothing. In fact, it studies the relationship between 
institutional investors, outside board members, internal audit and profit smoothing. A hypothesis was formulated for each of these options and their effect 
on profit smoothing was tested. A regression model was used to test the hypotheses. Participants include companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange 
during 2000 ÷ 2008. Studied sample includes 138 companies. Relations were tested using an econometric model and ordinary least squares (OLS). The 
study used stepwise regression and Spearman correlation coefficient to prioritize. The results indicate a significantly positive relationship between non-
executive board percentage and significantly inverse relationship between internal audit and common shareholders’ equity and profit smoothing. 
Spearman correlation test revealed that outside directors have the highest effect on profit smoothing.  
Keywords: corporate ownership structure, profit management, profit smoothing 
Odnos između mehanizama korporativnog upravljanja i zadržane dobiti 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Cilj je ovoga rada ispitati neke mehanizme korporativnog upravljanja zadržanom dobiti. U stvari, proučava se odnos između institucijskih investitora, 
vanjskih članova uprave, internog audita i zadržane dobiti. Formulirana je hipoteza za svaku od ovih opcija te je testiran njihov učinak na zadržanu dobit. 
Hipoteze su testirane modelom regresije. Među sudionicima su kompanije članovi Tehran Stock Exchange (teheranske Burze) u razdoblju 2000. ÷ 2008. 
Ispitivani uzorak uključuje 138 kompanija. Odnosi su ispitivani primjenom ekonometrijskog modela i uobičajenih metoda najmanjih kvadrata (OLS). 
Primijenjena je postupna regresija i Spearmanov koeficijent korelacije kod određivanja prioriteta. Rezultati pokazuju značajno pozitivan odnos u postotku 
onih koji su vanjski članovi uprave i signifikantno suprotan odnos između internog audita i običnih dionica dioničara te zadržane dobiti. Spearmanov 
korelacijski test je pokazao da vanjski direktori uprave imaju najveći utjecaj na zadržanu dobit.   
Ključne riječi: struktura korporativnog vlasništva, upravljanje dobiti, zadržana dobit 
1 Introduction 
The most important aspect of corporations is to 
separate ownership and its management. In the past 30 
years, economics have reported many inter-group interest 
conflicts and how companies deal with these 
contradictions. These cases are generally considered as 
agency theory in management accounting. According to 
agency theory, owners attempt to maximize wealth; 
therefore, they monitor agency’s work and evaluate its 
performance in order to achieve this goal [1].  
Net profit is also one of the items included in the 
financial statements; it considerably influences the 
decisions of financial statement users such as 
shareholders and is highly interested. Hence, it is 
generally thought that the structure of corporate 
ownership may lead to a change in corporate behavior; 
this is due to business activity monitoring in which many 
investors are interested [2]. Theoretically, institutions may 
tend to actively monitor management [3]. Ownership 
structure considerably affects management decisions in 
favor of profit including profit management [1]. The 
subject of Corporate Governance raised in 1990s in 
response to problems and effectiveness of director board 
in great corporations. Evaluation of Corporate 
Governance shows that it is a multidisciplinary concept 
whose ultimate goal is to achieve responsiveness, justice 
(fairness), transparency and respect for stakeholders’ 
equity [4].  
Considering different properties of corporate 
governance can lead to controlled authorities in reporting. 
The system can be associated with firm performances, 
profit sharing policy, stock price, stock returns, corporate 
capital cost, effective agency cost and concepts like profit 
manipulation, profit management and profit smoothing. 
Profit smoothing indicates management efforts to reduce 
profit fluctuations in reasonable and acceptable range of 
accounting and management policies. Present study 
examines the relationship between corporate governance 
and profit smoothing mechanisms. 
2 Literature review 
Some managers tend to manage and abuse profit and 
as a result provide shareholders with incorrect 
information; this causes serious damages to shareholders’ 
trust followed by acute economic consequences. 
Corporate governance may lead to good management 
practices, decrease in information asymmetry, increase in 
shareholders’ trust and ultimately decrease in profit 
management by inter-organizational mechanisms which 
are more optional [5]. 
Good governance, operational and financial 
transparency increases the liquidity of the stock market 
and as a result decreases information asymmetry between 
domestic and foreign investors [6]. Assessing institutional 
control and management of benefits arising from missed 
opportunities concluded that institutional investors avoid 
involvement to manage accruals in order to smooth profit 
to achieve the desired level of profit [7]. 
Using data from 175 Greek companies, evaluation of 
corporate ownership structure and firm performance 
showed that more centralized ownership structure is 
positively related to higher profitability and also that less 
dispersion leads to higher profit [8]. 
Evaluation of accrual management, investor’s skills 
and equity concluded that institutional investors are more 
able to analyze accrual components compared to 
individual investors; this fact results in accurate 
evaluation of profit [9].  
Assessment of profit management to increase profit 
threshold showed that profit management is a kind of 
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artificial manipulation for some specific decisions, 
definition and main motivation for profit management and 
management of investors’ vision about business unit [10].  
Analyzing financial statements and evaluating 
securities, Penman concluded that there is a direct 
relationship between profit quality and stock returns [11]. 
Moradzadeh et al. [12] examined the relationship between 
the number of institutional investors as well as their focus 
and profit management. He concluded that there is a 
significantly negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and profit management. 
Noravesh and Ebrahimi Kordlar [13] found that there 
is more information asymmetry in firms with high 
institutional investors; while, there is more information 
asymmetry in firms with low corporate investors. 
Assessing institutional ownership and conservative 
accounting, Mehrani et al. [14] showed that as 
institutional ownership increases, the companies tend to 
use more conservative procedures. Corporate governance 
literature emphasizes establishing internal audit, using 
outside members in the Board and performing 
independent audit. Correct implementation of corporate 
governance leads to on-time information disclosure and 
avoidance of severe fluctuations, profit estimates and 
manipulation in prices [15]. 
Chekili [18] examined the impact of some 
governance mechanisms on earnings management 
published by 20 anonymous listed Tunisian firms during 
the 2000 ÷ 2009 period, totaling a number of 200 
observations. Usman and Shehu [19] investigated the 
relationship between earnings management and 
characteristics of corporate governance mechanism for a 
sample of Jordanian non-financial firms during the period 
2006 ÷ 2009. Earnings management was measured by 
discretionary accruals using the Jones models. The results 
of their study indicated that the size of board of directors 
was the only variable that had a significant relation with 
earnings management. Investigating the relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings management 
is hard to study because firm level variation in 
governance (above regulatory minima) and accruals are 
both endogenous firm choices and there is limited time 
variation in governance [20].  
 
3 Objectives and hypotheses 
 
In order to answer the research questions, these 
hypotheses were formulated:  
H1. There is a significant relationship between 
institutional investment ownership and profit smoothing. 
 H2. There is a significant relationship between 
outside board members and profit smoothing. 
H3. There is a significant relationship between 
internal audit and profit smoothing. 
 
4 Research methodology 
 
The methodology used for this descriptive functional 
study is inductive. Data was rationally collected and was 
analyzed based on correlation using regression analysis. 
 
4.1 Population, sampling and sample size 
 
Participants included the companies listed in Tehran 
Stock Exchange. The sample size was 138 companies. 
Sampling method was conditional sampling to 
homogenize samples. Companies were included that meet 
the following requirements: 
- Companies accepted in stock before 2000 and their 
trademark not removed from stock trading panel up to 
the end of 2008. 
- Financial mediator and investment companies are 
excluded, because their nature and works are 
different. 
- Companies with no losses during considered period. 
 
4.2 Data analysis 
 
Required data were extracted using the software 
packages RahAvardNovin, TadberPardaz and information 
available in Tehran Stock Exchange (See Tab. 1). 
 
4.3 Smoothing index (SMTH) 
 
The present study evaluated profit smoothing based 
on fluctuability (variability) of profits compared to cash 
flow fluctuations. For this, standard deviation of net profit 
before extraordinary items is divided by standard 
deviation of operational cash flows. To standardize profit 
and operational cash flows, they are divided by average 
total assets [16].  
Computations are as follows:  
 
SMTH = ∂NI/∂CFO 
 
where, SMTH is profit smoothing index; ∂NI is standard 
deviation of net profit before extraordinary items; ∂CFO 
is standard deviation of cash flows from operations. 
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Net profit was extracted from income statement and 
cash flows of operations were extracted from cash flow 
statements. Assets were extracted from balance sheet and 
the total average was calculated as follow: 
 
ATA = TAt /TAt−1, 
 
where, ATA is average total assets; TAt is total assets in 
year t (assets at the end of the period); TAt−1 is total assets 
in year t−1 (assets at the end of the period). 
Finally, smoothing index is multiplied by (−1) to 
interpret and separate smoothing companies from non-
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smoothing companies. Companies with a larger index 
(close to zero) are profit smoothing companies and others 
are non-profit smoothing companies. 
Other variables include institutional investors’ 
ownership, outside board directors and internal audit 
which can be extracted from board reports and issued 
statements. The present study used information available 
in the library of Stock Exchange, financial reports and 
documents of corporations, information and data from 
accounting software called RAHAVARD NOVIN and 
Stock Exchange website. 
 
4.4 Hypotheses and results 
 
As profit smoothing was calculated for studied 
companies, the following equation was used to determine 
the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables, and coefficients of corporate governance 
mechanisms on profit smoothing: 
 
Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + ε, 
 
where, Y is profit smoothing for firm i at the end of the 
year t; X1 is institutional investors’ ownership in firm i at 
the end of the year t; X2 is outside directors of the 
company i at the end of the year t; X3 is internal audit of 
the company i at the end of the year t; Bi is the estimated 
regression coefficients; ε is model error. 
Estimation of above equation determined the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on profit smoothing. 
The relationship, type of relationship (direct or inverse) 
and relationship size were extracted by estimation of 
coefficients βi.  
Statistical tests were also conducted by the software 
to determine reliability of the model. Model significance, 
significance of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables, co-linearity of variables and 
homoscedasticity were determined by estimating F, 
statistical t, R2 and Durbin-Watson (DW).  
In addition to least squares, the study used Spearman 
correlation coefficient and stepwise regression to test 
hypotheses. Calculations were performed by spreadsheet 
EVIEWS and SPSS software. In summary, the results 
suggested a significant relationship between three 
independent variables and dependent variable (income 
smoothing) and confirmed three hypotheses using three 
methods of ordinary least square regression, Spearman 
correlation coefficient and stepwise regression. 
 
5 Results and discussion 
 
Tab. 2 shows that coefficient of determination is 
approximately 73 %. This means that 73 % of dependent 
variable can be explained by independent variables.  
Statistical T should be >1,96 in 95 % confidence 
level. T statistics related to all independent variables is 
significance in 95 % confidence level. F statistics should 
also be >3,8 in 95 % confidence level. In the estimated 
model, statistical F is 22 which indicate significance of 
the whole fitted model.  
Equation errors are also normally distributed with 
mean zero. To examine normalized equation errors, error 
component curve is plotted in regression model. As 
indicated in the diagram below, since mean error 
distribution is zero and its standard deviation is close to 1, 
then distribution of regression errors is normal (Fig. 1). 
Durbin-Watson statistics is 2,03 according to 
estimated results. If Durbin-Watson statistics is 1,5 ÷ 2,5, 
lack of self-correlation can be accepted between the 
model errors. Thus, independence of errors is confirmed 
in the estimated regression model.  
 
 
Figure 1 Histogram of error components 
 
Estimation of parameters was confirmed in last step 
of regression (Tabs. 3 and 4). Its R2 is estimated as 0,679 
suggesting that 67,9 % profit smoothing changes can be 
explained through three variables including outside board 
directors, institutional investors’ ownership and internal 
audit.  
Therefore, stepwise regression analysis indicated that 
explanatory variables including outside board directors, 
institutional investors’ ownership and internal auditor are 
significant for profit smoothing.  
Interestingly, results of ordinary least squares and 
stepwise regression are consistent to confirm or reject 
hypotheses, score and determine significance of the three 
variables for profit smoothing and they are significantly 
related. This indicates validity and accuracy of the results 
and interpretation. 
The findings of this study are in contrast with those of 
foreign studies; for example Xie et al. [17] studied 
corporate governance and profit management; evaluating 
280 companies they found that profit management is less 
done in companies in which outside directors are more 
than total members. 
That is why the opposite observed in Iranian 
companies can be explained as follows: 
1)  Significant dominance of government on economics, 
including studied corporations. According to the 
dominance of the State on appointment of directors 
and board members of some governmental and semi-
governmental companies, independence of outside 
directors and board members is practically damaged . 
Many of shareholders and representatives are 
dependent on governmental system. This results in 
underscored independence for decisions making and 
reporting by subsidiary companies. This is even true 
for other non-public companies; so that directors are 
appointed as a team of the same interests and the 
same benefits.  
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2) Considering physical presence of outside board 
directors in operational processes of subsidiaries for 
financial reporting, they may have less control on 
activities and validity of financial reports at the end 
of the year. As a result, they cannot prevent 
fraudulent practices of managers such as profit 
smoothing. 
3) Short-time outside directors, which is not often more 
than one year, cause them to have less detailed 
knowledge of company processes. This can make 
them not properly able to prevent possible 
manipulations of profit and smoothing it. 
 
Table 2 Output of model 
Model output observations Independent 
variable Coefficient of determination R2 F statistics 
Durbin-Watson   
statistics P-value T statistics 
Relationship with 
dependent variable 
Coefficients β of 
regression equation 
73 % 22,88181 2,03 




0.0000 4,635 + 2,34 Outside board directors X2 
0,0099 −2,034 - 0,45 Internal Audit X3 
 
Table 3 Statistics of last step regression 
Model Correlation coefficient 
Coefficient of 
determination 
Justified coefficient of 
determination Durbin-Watson statistics F statistics P value 
1 0,824 0,679 0,634 1,777 19,49 0,000 
 
Table 4 Estimation of parameters for the last step 
P-value T statistics Standard deviation Estimate  
0,220 1,548 5,68 8,79 Intercept 
0,002 3,214 4,45 14,30 Independent Variable (X2) 
0,034 −2,733 2,41 −6,60 Independent Variable (X1) 




Generally, results suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between three mechanisms related to 
corporate governance including outside board directors, 
internal audit and institutional shareholders’ ownership 
and profit smoothing. Consequently, institutional 
shareholders’ ownership can be confirmed by profit 
smoothing. Thus, institutional shareholders’ ownership 
has the greatest influence on profit smoothing followed by 
outside board directors and finally internal audit.  
Inverse significance relationship between 
institutional investors’ ownership and profit smoothing in 
studied companies indicates their outstanding role in the 
company. This finding is consistent with Moradzadeh et 
al. [12] finding that has a significant negative relationship 
between institutional ownership level and profit 
management.  
Institutional investors have more information about 
the results of operations, profitability and future cash 
flows of a company compared to others. Hence, they are 
aware of profit smoothing or management of investing 
companies. This could lead to restrictions on profit 
smoothing or management by the managers of 
subsidiaries. Findings of the present study are consistent 
with this; while minor investors are not allowed to.  
Regulations of a company should be consistent with 
its regulatory atmosphere. Since some findings of this 
study done in Iran were different from similar foreign 
studies as well as differences in the economic, political 
and cultural settings of western countries and Iran, it is 
necessary to localize regulations related to corporate 
governance. Hence, it is appropriate to avoid copying and 
hasty adoption in writing regulations of exchange 
governance. Otherwise, the regulations will fail. Thus, it 
is helpful to consider findings of studies done in Iran and 
in Iranian economic atmosphere; it is expected to 
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